Holocaust Memorial Month – A time when the world remembers the death of Jews in Europe but turns a blind eye to what’s happening right now in the Congo

Posted: 23 January, 2025 | Category: Uncategorized

The wretched of the African earth, struggling to survive against men with slogans in their heads and guns in the hands

 

The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has long been embroiled in conflict, with over 100 armed, non-state groups, some competing for control of the mineral-rich region to fund their wars and other settling old tribal scores, or both. This protracted conflict has resulted in one of the world’s most severe humanitarian crises, with approximately six million deaths (mostly from disease and malnutrition, but on the scale of the Holocaust) and seven million internally displaced persons since 1998. The dearth of news from the regional conflict, which trumps both Ukraine and Gaza in casualty numbers, is staggering. Special correspondent ANDREW FIELD reports –

 

This article concerns itself principally with the Bertrand Bisima[1] led Mouvement du 23 mars (M23 – March 23 Movement), also known as the Armée révolutionnaire du Congo (ARC – Congolese Revolutionary Army) and current activity in North Kivu Province of the DRC. Rebel activity is broad spread and perpetrated by many armed, non-state groups, characterized by a complex web of alliances, with strong ethnic dimensions. The tension between the Congolese and Rwandan governments aggravates these alliances, particularly those targeting the M23 rebel group.

On one side, the Forces d’Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo (FARDC – the Armed Forces of the DRC or Congolese army) have formed partnerships with ethnic Hutu militias such as the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR – Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda). These associations are clearly strategic move against the predominantly Tutsi M23 rebels. The FARDC garnered support from United Nations (UN) peacekeepers and the East African Community.

The other belligerent is M23, allegedly supported by the Rwandan Defence Force (RDF); a claim consistently denied by Rwanda. It would seem clearly evident from UN reports, victim and eyewitness accounts that the provision of uniforms, equipment, and direct military support is of Rwandan origin; substantially enhancing the M23’s military capabilities and enabling tactics such as mortar and artillery shelling.

In January 2025, there was a major intensification of the conflict in North Kivu, in eastern DRC. Rebels closed in on Goma, on the edge of Lake Kivu; a key town and transport hub that services much of the DRC. M23 rebels reportedly took control of Sake and Masisi, both key towns west of Goma. Some reports suggest rebels had taken Goma too. Heavily armed and well equipped M23 rebels were raising ‘tolls’ along the Sake to Kitshanga highway suggesting significant territorial advances.

The Tutsi-led M23 group has intensified its insurgency since 2022, raising accusations from Kinshasa and the UN that Rwanda continued providing military aid and support to extremely well equipped rebels. The recent fighting has led to significant territorial gains for M23 and violations of a ceasefire agreement, complicating peace efforts and displacing over 2 million people in recent years. Local officials express urgency for government measures to restore order, while international organisations on the ground report disruptions in operations and heightened fears among residents.

The conflict in the Congo is multi-layered and very complex. The genesis of the troubles is in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 after which many of the deposed Hutu armed forces and militia fled to eastern DRC, principally the North and South Kivu Provinces. The genocide, perpetrated by Hutu power groups (called Interahamwe) that claimed 800 thousand lives and sparked violent turmoil and insurrection in the mineral rich region. The Rwandan Hutu regime was overthrown by a Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) after President Juvénal Habyarimana[2] was assassinated when his plane was shot down on 9 April 1994 by rebel forces.

 

President Mobutu Sese Seko with the late Queen Elizabeth 11. For 21 years ( November 1965 – May 1997) this Congolese criminal and mass murderer was America’s best friend in Africa. 

 

Goma had become the hub for millions of Rwandan Hutu refugees; and a humanitarian crisis. It was estimated that some 50,000 people had died from cholera outbreak in 2007 that swept through massively overcrowded refugee camps. The then called Zaire, under the corrupt dictator Mabuto Sese Seko, had been suffering both political and economic collapse at the time of the refugee influx. This period saw the formation many dozens of armed and equipped rebel or insurgent groups; some opposed to the Mabuto regime, but others, including exile Interahamwe militants, intent on destabilizing the new Tutsi regime in Kigali.

One such group, the Armée pour la libération du Rwanda (ALIR – Army for the Liberation of Rwanda), had been terrorising indigenous Congolese, especially those of Tutsi ethnicity, giving rise to a rebellion by Banyamulenge ethnic group, motivated by Rwanda. Both Rwanda and Uganda collaborated by invading the eastern Congo, under the auspice of the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (ADFLC – Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo) and emergent, self-appointed, rebel leader, Laurent Desire Kabila[3].

This sparked First Congo War that raged on between 1996-1997. By March 1997 the ADFLC had marched into Kinshasa and Mabuto was eventually deposed by rebel leader Kabila, who proclaimed himself President of the Republic in September 1997. The conflict was not quelled; the eastern Congo remained an unstable war zone in economic disarray. Kabila perhaps made a disastrous turncoat error, for the newly established DRC, in that he allowed Hutu armies in the east to regroup, thus turning his back on his former allies and sponsors who had support the rebellion against Mobutu’s despotic regime.

Thus, between 1998 and 2003 the Second Congo War exploded across the east of the country, following a joint invasion of the eastern Congo by Rwandese and Ugandan armies. They had been in pursuit of, and to root out, the Hutu dissident groups that had been festering for a squabble in the North and South Kivu regions. Kabila had set off yet another violent conflict, in his actions to expel foreign (Rwandan and Ugandan) troops.

Laurent Desire Kabila: He proclaimed himself President of the Republic of the Congo in September 1997 and the  Western media rejoiced, claiming a new golden age had started in a place Conrad called Heart of Darkness

 

Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, all Southern African Development Community (SADC) nations, sent in their troops in support of Kabila’s regime. The conflict had drawn in seven belligerent African nations, and culminated in a July 1999 Lusaka Ceasefire, peace accord signed in Zambia. Kabila was assassinated just two years later having been gunned down by a child soldier on 16 January 2001. He had been rushed to Harare, Zimbabwe by air, but had died before arrival. His son, Joseph Kabila[4], assumed the Presidency.

In November 1999 the UN, by resolution 1279 of the Security Council, formed MONUC as a peacekeeping force to monitor the ceasefire. Rather than focusing on the main issue it was drawn into assisting the quelling of two side conflicts, one in Ituri Province[5] and the other in the Dongo Province[6]. During the years that followed some 40 nations made military manpower contributions and the operation came to cost in excess of US$ 8.5 billion, apparently the most expensive mission in UN history[7]! By 2005, there were some 20,000 troops deployed on the mission.

The city of Goma was to become the ‘whipping boy’ of the eastern Congo… it suffered a massive disruption when the volcanic Mount Nyiragongo erupted destroying a part of the town in January 2002. In November that year Goma succumbed to a rebel take over by the Emile Ilunga[8] led Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma (RCD-G – Rally for Congolese Democracy-Goma); an anti-Kabila faction, militant off shoot from the Second Congo War that later converted to a political party and entered mainstream politics.

This rebel group had taken control of Kisangani, supported by Rwandan and Ugandan troops, in 2000 and had been responsible for many extrajudicial executions. RCD troops numbering some 20-30,000 were drawn mainly from Banyamulenge ethnic Tutsi clans. Some 10 years later Goma was under duress once more, this time by elements of the March 23 Movement or simply M23. It is a Congolese Tutsi-led rebel group.

The M23 rebellion has its origins in the April 2012 mutiny of 300 former Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (CNDP – National Congress for the Defence of the People) combatants led by the war criminal Bosco Ntaganda[9], a General in the Forces d’Armees de la Republique Democratique du Congo, (FARDC – the Armed Forces of the DRC or Congolese army). After Ntaganda’s replacement by Sultani Makenga, (M23 military chief) the group adopted the name M23 and gradually attracted support from other ex-CNDP fighters who had previously served in the RDC-G and CNDP. M23 proved to be a formidable, combat experienced, force; well supported by Rwandan Army. The group initially faced pressure from the FARDC but soon regained significant territory, culminating in the capture of the North Kivu provincial capital, Goma, in November 2012.

By that time, the United Nations was in the process of listing M23 as a sanctioned or terrorist organisation (it was so listed on 31 December 2012) and reported to the Security Council that the rebel group was linked to serious human rights violations. It was supported, militarily, by the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF). M23 was reportedly responsible for grave violations of international law, suggesting M23’s involvement in mass civilian murders and sexual assaults. By these activities, M23 have exacerbated instability and conflict in the region and breached international law.

 

The M23 rebel group in the DRC proved to be an effective military force, with control over a substantial territory by 2012. They were never to generate local political support though, even among their core constituency of Congolese Tutsis. In fact, the M23’s brutally violent and militarized approach led to its widespread denunciation. Viewed largely as proxies for Rwanda, their call for a nationwide revolution fell flat, with only a single Congolese officer from outside the Kivus defecting to join them.

The result was a military stalemate, with the M23 unchallenged in their territory but isolated from broader political support. The fall of Goma in 2012 led to international pressure, pushing the M23 and government eventually into talks in Kampala, which dragged on for years without resolution. These negotiations always seemed unlikely to produce a political deal, and ended up a series of largely symbolic declarations, falling short of a comprehensive peace agreement.

Bosco Ntaganda is a convicted war criminal and the former military chief of staff of the National Congress for the Defence of the People.  He is a former member of the Rwanda Patriotic Army.

 

Despite initial optimism and progress on various issues, the negotiations stalled over the fate of the M23’s top setting the stage for violent internal divisions within the M23 that ultimately led to its collapse in early 2013. Parallel diplomatic initiatives may have temporarily stifled external support from Rwanda, and consequently M23 lost its strongholds and retreated, eventually beaten, with its combatants fleeing into exile in Rwanda and Uganda.

The Security Council authorise and intervention brigade in March 2013 to be deployed on targeted offensive operations. The SADC Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC) formed and deployed on 15 December 2013, to bolster UN forces and support FARDC, code named Operation Thiba, with its headquarters in Sake utilising troops drawn from South Africa, Tanzania and Malawi. This initiative was intended to replace the UN Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) that had been in the DRC for 25 years as well as a recent East African Community deployment. Tanzania and Malawi have committed 2 100 troops to the mission. South Africa has committed 2,900 troops to the mission.

Forward 8 years, since November 2021, the M23 rebel group has re-emerged as a significant threat in the DRC, primarily engaging in battles with the Congolese military and occasionally clashing with local militias, fundamentally, they say, to defend and protect the interests of Congolese Tutsi kinsmen, discriminated against by the regime, particularly the military. One M23 commentator justified their actions saying, “A part of the citizens, namely the Tutsi, serve as scapegoats for the Congolese government to distract the people from its governance failures.”

The conflict is now characterized by intense fighting, including aerial strikes by the FARDC and alleged renewed Rwandan involvement, further complicating regional tensions. Initially, the M23 engaged in clashes with FARDC and aligned groups in Rutshuru territory. By early 2022, they launched a southward offensive towards Goma, capturing strategic military bases, including the largest in North Kivu Province. After a brief lull in mid-2022, the M23 renewed its push in October, expanding operations westward and northward.

November 2022 marked a turning point, with the M23 dramatically increasing its territorial control. By December, the group had tripled its territory compared to March of the same year, becoming the most successful rebel group in overtaking land in the DRC. The first quarter of 2023 saw continued conflict, with a new fighting front developing in Masisi territory and clashes reported as far west as Osso and Bahunde.

The M23’s strategic advances have allowed them to control western trade routes from Goma, reaching as close as 15 kilometers to the city. This expansion has significant implications for regional stability and the Congolese government’s control over its eastern territories. The group’s rapid territorial gains and military successes highlight the ongoing security challenges faced by the DRC and the need for effective strategies to address the conflict.

While the majority of M23 activity involves direct confrontations with the FARDC, the impact on civilian populations has been substantial. Over 750 fatalities have been reported, with at least 134 civilians killed in targeted attacks. The violence has also led to the displacement of more than 500,000 people in Nord Kivu province alone.

Men with slogans in their heads and guns in their hands – a ghastly combination that has caused the death of millions of ordinary men, women and children throughout Africa. 

 

Compared to their 2012-2013 offensive, the M23 has shown a notable shift in strategy regarding civilian targeting. The rebels were still engaged in looting and property destruction, particularly in Rutshuru, Masisi, and Nyiragongo territories, but constitute a smaller percentage of the group’s overall violent activities. This change may reflect an effort by them to build stronger political legitimacy in areas under their control. The group has established local administrators and attempted to foster a positive public image; presenting itself as an alternative authority to the FARDC, which has reportedly engaged in higher levels of violence against civilians, especially Tutsis.

The M23 rebel group’s activity in North Kivu continue to escalate with no sign of abatement. The group’s expansion, its ceasefire breaches, acceptance of defectors from the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) to M23 suggest very much that ongoing operations are likely. This evolving situation underscores the complex nature of the conflict and its volatile landscape. Resolution will require political, diplomatic and dominantly military efforts involving the regime in Kinshasa, M23, and the Kagame’s government.

M23’s primary objective appears to be re-capturing Goma, a strategic economic hub they previously targeted in 2012-13. Their southward offensive towards Goma, westward fighting near Sake town, and efforts to cut regional supply routes support this assessment. The group’s actions aim to isolate the region and force dependence on trade routes from Rwanda.

Regional military cooperation and UN peacekeepers may still be able to counter the recent M23 offensive, as they did in 2013. Additional troops from Angola and Burundi could strengthen these efforts. The situation remains complex, with ongoing governance challenges and potential for broader insecurity in North Kivu Province.

Early in the last week (mid January), the Congolese army reported it had made significant progress in recapturing several towns from rebel forces in both North Kivu, including the strategic town of Ngungu, near Goma. M23 rebels continue to advance in other areas, maintaining control over some villages in the Masisi territory. Aid workers suggest that at least half of the North Kivu area is now dominated by rebels and nearly two million people displaced since 2022.

The DRC’s President Felix Tshisekedi[10] and Rwanda’s President Kagame were scheduled to meet in Luanda, Angola in mid December 2024 under the auspices of Angolan President João Lourenço; and on behalf of the African Union (an organisation that has been remarkable silent). Lourenço, had high hopes the Presidents would come to some agreement to resolve the conflict stalemate. The deal sought would require the DRC to ‘neutralise’ the FDLR armed Rwandan dissidents on its territory, while Rwanda would withdraw its armed forces operating in the DRC and cease support for M23 rebels in the same territory.

Talks between the two leaders were called off after negotiations deadlocked. Lourenco met Tshisekedi, without Kagame. Observers see Rwanda’s last-minute insistence on this dialogue as a stalling tactic, prolonging instability in the region while benefiting from M23’s military actions.

In public, he keeps a low profile about his role in the Congo – but Paul Kagame of Rwanda is central to both the problem and the solution to a ghastly situation that involves the deaths of millions of Africans.

 

Last week, Thursday, Paul Kagame, now spinning his position on the failed talks, urged Congolese authorities to negotiate directly with the M23 rebel group, which Congo accuses Rwanda of supporting! Kagame, opines that direct talks with the rebels are a necessity for a political solution to the conflict. The Congolese presidency said that negotiations had hit deadlock over the Rwandan demand for direct dialogue with the Kigali-backed M23 rebels. Tshisekedi is sticking to the Congolese line once summarised in Parliament by him saying “Our country continues to face persistent rebellions, including the aggression by the Rwandan army and the M23 terrorists,” calling the militants and Rwanda “enemies of the Republic.”

The germane issue here is that M23 is simply not a political player, it has no real, consistent, popular cause or a base for negotiation, other than discrimination against the Congolese Tutsi population. These inabilities and weaknesses were exposed at the futile Kampala talks between the government and the rebels. M23 had not negotiated in good faith, making unrealistic demands, instead of addressing the unfulfilled 2009 peace deal. One might be driven to wonder if their latest foray has more sinister motives driven by neighbouring territories.

M23 is now on the back foot, its activities are that of a neighbour sponsored criminal insurrection which lacks political support. Political dialogue with non-state armed groups, without real cause, may not achieve meaningful resolution, especially with this impasse. Seemingly, peace is a bridge too far. Yet, potentially, it may upset the political balance of Africa. The prognosis is not good with tensions only likely to rise. The potential for further escalation, drawing regional players into the conflict is real, once more.

 

 

 

[1] Bertrand Bisimwa: Little is known of this rebel’s antecedents aside from his approximate birth in  1973 in the Bukavu Distict of South Kivu.  He fled the DRC for Uganda in 2013.

[2] Juvénal Habyarimana (1937-1994) was a Rwandan politician and military officer who was the second president of Rwanda, from 1973 until his assassination in 1994. He was nicknamed Kinani, a Kinyarwanda word meaning “invincible”.   He born on 8 March 1937, in Gisenyi, Ruanda-Urundi to a wealthy Hutu family. After receiving a primary education, he attended the College of Saint Paul in Bukavu, Belgian Congo, where he graduated with a degree in mathematics and humanities. In 1958 he enrolled in Lovanium University’s medical school in Léopoldville. After the beginning of the Rwandan Revolution the following year, Habyarimana left Lovanium and enrolled in the officer training school in Kigali. He graduated with distinction in 1961 and became an aide to the Belgian commander of the force in Rwanda. – Wikipedia

[3] Laurent-Désiré Kabila (1939–2001) was a Congolese rebel and politician who served as the third president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1997 until his assassination in 2001.  Kabila became known during the 1960s Congo Crisis as an opponent of Mobutu Sese Seko. He took part in the Simba rebellion and led the Communist-aligned Fizi rebel territory until the 1980s. In the 1990s, Kabila re-emerged as leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFLC), a Rwandan and Ugandan-sponsored rebel group that invaded Zaire and overthrew Mobutu during the First Congo War from 1996 to 1997.  He was born on 27 November 1939 in Baudouinville or Jadotville, Belgian Congo and assassinated 16 January 2001 in Kinshasa. – Wikipedia

[4] Joseph Kabila Kabange (1971 – ) is a Congolese politician who served as President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between January 2001 and January 2019. He took office ten days after the assassination of his father, President Laurent-Désiré Kabila. He remained in power as the president of the country’s new transitional government, after the 2003 Pretoria Accord ended the war. Kabila was elected as president in 2006 and then re-elected in 2011 for a second term. He was born on born 4 June 1971 according to official accounts, at Hewabora, a small village in the Fizi Territory of the South Kivu Province. It has been rumoured that Kabila was actually born in Tanzania, which would make him a citizen of that country. He completed primary and secondary school in Tanzania. Due to his father’s status as an enemy of Zairean strongman Mobutu Sese Seko, Kabila posed as a Tanzanian in his school years to avoid detection by Zairean intelligence agents. – Wikipedia

[5] The Ituri Conflict was a low-intensity conflict in the north-eastern DRC, primarily between the agriculturalist Lendu and pastoralist Hema ethnic groups. The conflict, which began in 1999 during the Second Congo War, has resulted in significant violence and displacement. Factors such as land disputes, natural resource extraction, and ethnic tensions fueled the conflict. Despite various peacekeeping efforts, including a French-led EU mission in 2003, violence continued, displacing nearly 2 million people.

[6] The Dongo Conflict was a brief but intense conflict in the DRC, centered in the town of Dongo on the Ubangi River in Sud-Ubangi District. It began in late October 2009 following a dispute over fishing rights between the Enyele and Monzaya villages. The conflict quickly escalated, leading to widespread violence and the displacement of over 168,000 civilians by December 2009.

[7] MONUC has the largest budget of any of the over fifteen UN peacekeeping missions around the globe, absorbing roughly US$ 650 million in the global peacekeeping budget of US$ 2.8 billion a year. If put in perspective, UN peacekeeping has cost US$ 31.5 billion since its inception in 1948, while yearly military expenditures worldwide are estimated at US$ 839 billion! – United Nations

[8] Émile Ilunga Kalambo is a politician and former leader of the Rally for Congolese Democracy–Goma (RDC-Goma) rebel movement.  Little is known of his personal antecedents.  Ilunga is a medical doctor from Katanga. – Wikipedia

[9] Bosco Ntaganda was, until March 2013, wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the war crimes of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of fifteen and using them to participate actively in hostilities. Prior to his surrender, Ntaganda had been allegedly involved in the rebel group March 23 Movement, a military group based in eastern areas of the DRC. On 18 March 2013, Ntaganda voluntarily handed himself in to the U.S. Embassy in Rwanda, asking to be transferred to the ICC. On 22 March, he was taken into custody by the ICC and 8 July 2019, was convicted for his war crimes. He was subsequently sentenced to 30 years for crimes against humanity.  – Wikipedia

[10] Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo (1963 – ) is the son of Étienne Tshisekedi, a prominent opposition leader and founder of the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS). Félix Tshisekedi became involved in politics early in his life, joining the UDPS and eventually becoming its leader after his father’s death in 2017. He was elected President of the DRC on January 24, 2019, suceeding Jospeh Kabila, marking the country’s first peaceful transition of power since its independence. Tshisekedi has also served as the Chairperson of the African Union from 6 February 2021 to 5 February 2022. He was was born on 13 June 1963, in Léopoldville, Zaire. – Wikipedia

 

ANDREW FIELD (above) is a former intelligence analyst who specialises in political, economic and social developments in Central and Southern Africa. Previous articles by him appear  on a blog called South of the African Equator and the link is https://justandrewinzimbabwe.wordpress.com